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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to con-
sider and hear this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah, Rule 3 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3) (j) (1988), and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Second Judicial District Court entered 
Final Summary Judgment in favor of the third-party defendants, 
Bountiful City and Davis County, on October 11, 1988, and 
certified the Judgment for appeal. A notice of appeal was 
filed on October 25, 1988. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the District Court correct in concluding that 
the acts complained of in the First Amended Complaint and the 
Amended Third-Party Complaint involved the management of flood 
waters and the construction, repair and operation of flood and 
storm systems? 
2. Was the District Court correct in classifying the 
activities of Bountiful City and Davis County, set forth in 
the Amended Third-Party Complaint and established during 
discovery, as governmental functions with absolute immunity? 
3. Is Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) unconstitution-
al in light of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution? 
4. Should the negligence and/or fault of Bountiful 
City and Davis County be compared by the jury on a special 
verdict form, along with the negligence and/or fault, if any, 
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of other parties to the litigation. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22. 
2. Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 63-30-3, 8, 9, 10 and 10.5. 
3. Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 78-27-38, 40 and 41. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case began as a property damage action brought 
by the plaintiffs (hereinafter "homeowners") against several 
defendants, including the owners and developers of land known 
as the Bridlewood Development. The homeowners1 complaint, in 
substance, sought to recover compensation for property damage 
resulting from floods which occurred in 1986. Third-party 
plaintiffs brought an action against Bountiful City and Davis 
County for contribution, indemnity, and a comparison of fault 
by way of a third-party complaint. 
Third-party plaintiffs seek review of the Order of 
the Second Judicial District Court granting summary judgment 
to third-party defendants (Bountiful City and Davis County) 
which was entered on October 11, 1988 (Addendum p. 1) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Third-party plaintiffs owned an interest in 
(hereinafter "landowners") or were involved in the planning, 
development and construction (hereinafter "developers") of 
improvements to real property located in Bountiful and known 
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as Bridlewood. 
2. On or about October 19, 1987, homeowners filed 
an amended complaint wherein they alleged that the landowners 
and developers are liable to them for damages. (R. 40; 
Addendum p. 7) 
3. The landowners and developers subsequently filed 
an amended third-party complaint against Bountiful City and 
Davis County alleging that they are entitled to indemnity, 
contribution, and/or comparison of fault of all parties, 
including Bountiful City and Davis County, pursuant to current 
comparative fault statutes. (R. 414; Addendum p. 16) 
4. The landowners retained the developers to 
develop the property. (Sandberg Depo. p. 14) 
5. The developers worked closely with Bountiful 
City and Davis County to comply with their rules, regulations 
and ordinances regarding the development of a residential 
subdivision. (R. 484) 
6. The developers complied with or exceeded all 
County and City ordinances while constructing the Bridlewood 
Subdivision. (R. 484) 
7. The developers were required to obtain final 
approval of their plans from the Bountiful City Planning and 
Zoning Commission, City Council, and City Engineer prior to 
beginning actual construction of the project. (R. 488) 
8. The developers were aware that flood control mea-
sures would be required during the construction process. The 
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developers agreed to abide by the requirements of Bountiful City, 
9• It was represented to the developers by Jack 
Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, that he (Balling) would also 
require the approval of Davis County before he allowed the 
developers to proceed with flood control measures in the 
subdivision project. (Sandberg Depo0 pp. 29, 264; Jenkins 
Depo. pp. 100-105) Throughout the entire construction of the 
Bridlewood project, Davis County was aware of what was 
transpiring. (Sandberg Depo. p. 32) 
10. The storm drainage system for the Bridlewood 
project had to be specifically approved by Davis County. 
(Jenkins Depo. p. 100; Sandberg Depo. p. 265) When the 
Bridlewood project was annexed by Bountiful City, it was 
agreed that Davis County would look over the plans to ensure 
the plans met the County's standards (Jenkins Depo. p. 101) 
The County was to review the progress of the storm drainage 
system as the project developed. (Jenkins Depo. p. 101) 
11. Davis County inspectors periodically visited the 
Bridlewood job site to inspect the work being done, including 
the installation of interim flood control facilities. 
(Sandberg Depo. pp. 72-73, 75, 105, 174, 240) 
12. The developers were granted final approval to 
proceed with the development of the Bridlewood project on 
September 11, 1985. (Sandberg Depo. p. 49) 
13. The developers planned to, and did in fact, 
develop Bridlewood in three separate phases. (Balling Depo. 
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p. 85) However, Bountiful City and Davis County imposed a re-
quirement on the developers that an access road be constructed 
in Bridlewood from the top of the subdivision to the bottom 
prior to the development of the first phase. (Balling Depo. 
p. 85) 
14. The developers initially intended to construct a 
dead-end road in the first phase of Bridlewood and extend the 
road into the second and third phases when development of 
those phases commenced. (Balling Depo. p. 90) However, when 
development of Bridlewood actually started, the developers 
were required by the City and the County to construct the 
access road in its entirety, rather than in phases. (Balling 
Depo. pp. 128-129) The purpose of the access road was to 
provide access to emergency vehicles, fire, police, and other 
service vehicles and personnel. (Balling Depo. p. 88) 
15. When the access road was excavated, the property 
was necessarily denuded of some vegetation. (Balling Depo. p. 
90) 
16. Construction of the road in Bridlewood required 
that deep cuts be made in the terrain, some at a depth of 20 
feet. (Sandberg Depo. p. 52) 
17. Immediately subsequent to making the cuts for the 
road in the fall of 1985, the developers planned to install a 
storm sewer system and build an on-site detention basin. 
(Sandberg Depo. p. 54) In the plans submitted by the develop-
ers and approved by Bountiful City, the developers proposed 
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constructing their own on-site detention basin to accommodate 
runoff, (Sandberg Depo. p. 38; Balling Depo. p. 27; Jenkins 
DepOo p. 104-105) 
18. Prior to and at or near this time period, Davis 
County was also in the process of deciding whether or not to 
build a regional detention basin. (Sandberg Depo. p. 65) 
Davis County had been considering constructing a regional 
storm detention basin since 1984 or 1985. Davis County had 
been working with North Salt Lake to bring a major storm 
drainage line up 3800 South to a point on the east side of 
Main Street or U.S. 89 with the intent of eventually bringing 
that facility on east to serve the areas east of Orchard Drive 
(the area of the Bridlewood Subdivision). (R. 350-51) 
19. Nevertheless, it was the understanding of the 
developers when they received final approval for the Bridlewood 
project that the decision to either build their own on-site 
detention basin or to participate in a regional detention 
basin was entirely within the control of the developers. 
(Sandberg Depo. p. 56) 
20. In the minutes of a special meeting of the 
Bountiful City Planning Commission, final approval was given 
to the Bridlewood project subject to the condition that the 
developers "provide storm detention for the runoff in the 
Hooper Canyon drainage basin with a release rate of 2 cfs. 
This may be provided on the Bridlewood property £r on the site 
for South Davis Boulevard through an agreement with Davis 
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County Commission . • .." (Deposition Exhibit No, 65) 
21. The developers began the excavation and con-
struction of the Bridlewood project with the clear under-
standing that they could utilize their own on-site detention 
basin if they desired. (Sandberg Depo. p. 66) 
22. In December of 1985 or January of 1986, the 
developers were informed by Jack Balling that, instead of 
constructing an on-site detention basin, they would have to 
contribute to the regional detention basin, which the County 
had decided to build, and that he (Balling) would not allow 
the developers to move ahead with the project until appropri-
ate arrangements had been made. (Sandberg Depo. p. 56) 
23. After Bountiful City imposed the requirement that 
developers participate in the regional detention basin, Bountiful 
City and Davis County delayed until May of 1986 in reaching an 
agreement with the developers. (Sandberg Depo. p. 66) 
24. The delay of Bountiful City and Davis County with 
respect to the regional detention basin was a constant concern 
to third-party plaintiffs. On January 16, 1986, Mark Sandberg, 
one of the developers, sent a letter to Davis County Commis-
sioner Tippets outlining his concern that the County would not 
have the regional detention basin on line on time. He stated: 
We are now ready to start construction of our 
storm drainage system. It is our desire to move 
ahead immediately with construction of the storm 
retention pond prior to the spring run off. 
During earlier discussions with the county, you 
have expressed a desire for us not to construct 
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our detention pond and participate with you in 
construction of a larger detention pond at a 
future crossing site at the Hooper Draw by Davis 
Blvd. We would still like to participate with 
the county on this venture, however, retention 
of our spring run-off and moving ahead with our 
lot development has become a critical item." 
(Emphasis added) (Deposition Exhibit No. 87) 
25. On January 23, 1986, Sid Smith, Davis County 
Flood Control Director, informed David Bird (a representative 
of the Consortium, the engineering company retained by the 
developers) that he (Smith) believed construction could begin 
on the regional detention basin within 90 days (i.e., 
approximately March 23, 1986). (Deposition Exhibit No. 57) 
26. By April, 1986, frustrated by the lengthy delay 
and in an effort to speed up the construction of the regional 
detention basin, the developers sent Davis County a $28,500 
check, which constituted one-half of developers1 monetary 
obligation toward the regional detention basin. This money 
was sent even before an "official" agreement was reached on 
May 12, 1986, regarding construction of the regional detention 
basin. (Jenkins Depo. p. 145; Deposition Exhibit 106) 
27. On May 12, 1986, one of the landowners executed 
a contract with Davis County which obligated Davis County to 
put the regional detention basin on line within eight months 
(i.e., approximately December of 1986). (Sandberg Depo. p. 
7 3; Deposition Exhibit No. 67) 
28. The regional detention basin was not timely 
completed. It did not begin to offer any protection from 
flood waters until late April of 1987 and was not fully com-
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pleted until early October of 1987. (Smith Depo. p. 37) 
29. The controversy concerning the location of the 
regional detention basin site delayed the Bridlewood project 
approximately six months. If the developers had been allowed 
to utilize an on-site detention basin as originally designed 
and approved, a fully operational storm sewer system would have 
been in operation at the time of the major summer storms which 
caused damage alleged by plaintiffs. (Sandberg Depo. p. 10 3) 
30. The developers attempted to remedy the failure 
of the County to have the regional detention basin in place by 
installing temporary flood control measures. These temporary 
flood control devices were approved by, and in some cases 
directed by, Bountiful City. (Sandberg Depo. pp. 57, 58, 
154) The temporary measures were better than what was sug-
gested or expected by Bountiful City. (Balling Depo. p. 75) 
Davis County characterized the interim flood control measures 
as "state of the art." (Smith Depo. pp. 98, 99) 
31. Heavy lf 100-year storms" occurred on July 23 and 
August 20, 1986, which combined with the conditions then 
existing on the Bridlewood Subdivision caused the plaintiffs 
to sustain the damages for which they seek recovery in this 
lawsuit. (R. 40) 
32. When the rainstorms did occur, neither Bountiful 
City nor Davis County undertook to manage the "flood waters" 
generated from the rainfall in the Bridlewood development area. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
for several fundamental reasons, any one of which standing 
alone is sufficient to merit reversal• 
A. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is Inapplicable to This Case. 
The activities of Bountiful City and Davis County 
which are at issue in this action do not involve decisions 
relating to the management of flood waters or the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems. The acts 
complained of involve unwarranted delays in decision making, 
as well as improper requirements imposed on those involved 
with the development and construction of the Bridlewood Project. 
Bountiful City and Davis County are attempting to 
escape liability by arguing that their actions involved the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems. 
This argument is made by focusing on the result of the negli-
gent acts (or inaction) rather than the acts themselves. The 
activities of Bountiful City and Davis County primarily 
involve delay in making a decision regarding the regional 
detention basin, requiring the developers to participate in a 
regional detention basin, and foreclosing the option of 
constructing their own on-site detention basin, as well as 
negligent decision making in requiring the roadway to be cut 
in one phase, rather than three phases. Davis County and 
Bountiful City were not involved in managing the flood waters 
even after the tremendous 100-year storms. Further, Davis 
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County and Bountiful City did not construct, repair, or operate 
a flood or storm system on the Bridlewood Project. That their 
negligent acts resulted in a flood should not operate to place 
them within the confines of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. Bountiful City's and Davis County's Activities Do Not 
Constitute Governmental Functions. Even if the Acts of 
Davis County and Bountiful City Are Found to be 
Governmental Functions, Such a Conclusion Results Merely 
in the Granting of Qualified Immunity. 
Because Bountiful City's and Davis County's activi-
ties are not acts involving the management of flood waters or 
the construction, repair or operation of flood or storm 
systems, such activities are not statutorily accorded 
"governmental function" status. Since the activities do not 
involve governmental functions, the qualified immunity 
bestowed by the Governmental Immunity Act is inapplicable. 
The acts of Bountiful City and Davis County do not 
constitute a governmental functions under Utah case law. 
"[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is whether 
the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that 
it is essential to the core of governmental activity." 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 
(Utah 1980). (The expanded statutory definition of governmen-
tal function did not become effective until 1987 and therefore 
is inapplicable to this action.) Bountiful City's and Davis 
County's actions in requiring the road to be cut in one phase 
instead of three distinct phases, the requirement that the 
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developers participate in a regional detention basin as opposed 
to constructing their own on-site facilities, and the delay in 
getting the regional detention basin operational, clearly do 
not satisfy the "governmental function" test. Because Bountiful 
City's and Davis County's actions cannot be classified as 
governmental functions, they therefore enjoy no immunity for 
those actions. 
Even if this Court concludes that Bountiful City's 
and Davis County's activities do satisfy the case law or stat-
utory definition of governmental function, the existence of 
governmental immunity is not established. The Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act grants only qualified immunity to governmental 
entities involved in governmental functions subject to the 
express waivers of immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-30-8 through 10.5. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986), covering injuries 
caused by defective or dangerous roadways, applies to 
Bountiful City's and Davis County's requirement that the 
access road be built in one phase. Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-9 
(1986) provides for the waiver of immunity for injuries caused 
by the dangerous or defective condition of any public improve-
ment. This provision is also applicable to the access road 
issue. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1986) covers the waiver of 
immunity for negligent acts committed by employees of 
governmental entities. This waiver pertains to the improper 
and unwarranted requirements imposed upon the third-party 
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plaintiffs by the City and County. Finally, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) provides for the waiver of immunity 
when a governmental entity takes or damages private property 
without just compensation. 
C. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is Unconstitutional. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation.11 It is apparent that 
the manner in which Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 (1986) is being 
applied at the trial level is inconsistent and in contraven-
tion of this constitutional mandate. In this case, §63-30-3 
is being applied so as to take or damage private property 
without just compensation. 
D. The Fault of Davis County and Bountiful City Must Be 
Compared. 
A final important point raised on appeal is the 
apportionment of liability, even if Bountiful City and Davis 
County are eventually found to be immune. 
The Utah Comparative Fault Act states that no defen-
dant is liable to a person seeking recovery for any amount 
greater than the proportion of fault attributable to that defen-
dant. This in effect abolishes the concept of joint and several 
liability in Utah. If Bountiful City's and Davis County's 
negligence is not allowed to be weighed and apportioned by the 
jury, it is highly likely that the third-party plaintiffs will 
be assessed a damage award that is much greater than the pro-
portion of fault actually attributable to them. This result 
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is in conflict with the statutory purpose. Releasing Bountiful 
City and Davis County from all liability, and not allowing the 
jury to apportion their negligence, will in effect subject 
third-party plaintiffs to joint and several liability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY AND 
DAVIS COUNTY IN RELATION TO THE BRIDLEWOOD 
PROJECT DID NOT INVOLVE THE MANAGEMENT OF 
FLOOD WATERS OR THE CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR, 
AND OPERATION OF FLOOD AND STORM SYSTEMS. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act §6 3-30-3 (1986) 
states in pertinent part: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
The immunity granted by this section applies to governmental 
entities in only two specific situations: (1) the management 
of flood waters and other natural disasters, and (2) the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems. Bountiful City and Davis County assert that their 
actions concerning the Bridlewood development are specifically 
granted immunity by this statute. Such reliance is misplaced. 
Before analyzing the two distinct activities granted 
governmental function status by the act, it is useful to dis-
cuss the two main areas in which the third-party plaintiffs' 
claim can be divided. First, Bountiful City and Davis County 
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imposed a requirement that an access road be constructed in a 
single phase, rather than in the three phases as had been ini-
tially planned. Second, the County and City delayed in 
getting the regional detention basin on line, and foreclosed 
the developers1 option to construct their own on-site 
detention facilities. 
A. Roadway 
As a condition to allowing construction to proceed on 
the Bridlewood Project, Davis County and Bountiful City required 
the developers to construct an access road from top to bottom 
of the Bridlewood Project. The developers initially intended 
to construct the road in three phases, but the City and County 
forced the developers to construct the entire road at once. 
Despite the concerns voiced by the developers, 
particularly Mark Sandberg, a large cut was required to be 
made through the entire length of the Bridlewood Project. In 
constructing the roadway, a significant amount of vegetation 
had to be stripped from the area. 
The unfinished road operated as an artificial 
stream bed for runoff water which increased the amount and 
speed of runoff flowing through the Bridlewood Project. 
Additionally, the denuding of vegetation in constructing the 
road contributed to the problem. 
If the developers had been allowed to construct the 
road in three separate phases, the amount of runoff flowing 
through the Bridlewood Project would have been significantly 
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decreased. First, the amount of vegetation required to be 
removed would have been reduced. In other words, vegetation 
would have been removed in three phases. Second, constructing 
the actual roadway in three phases would have drastically 
reduced the amount of water flowing through the project. By 
constructing only one section of the road at a time, and hav-
ing the section terminate in a dead end, a natural impediment 
to the flow of runoff would have been created. This would 
dramatically reduce the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. 
B. Delay 
This case involves a situation in which a developer 
was led to believe that it could construct an on-site deten-
tion facility to safeguard its project and nearby homeowners 
from the danger of runoff flooding. After initially agreeing 
with the choice by the developers to build an on-site deten-
tion basin, Davis County delayed and delayed, both in its 
decision as to what to do and how to do it. Finally, after 
the Bridlewood Project had been given approval and was already 
under construction, the County finally decided that it wanted 
a regional detention basin. Bountiful City then forced the 
developers to modify their plans concerning the on-site deten-
tion basin, tie in to the regional basin, and contribute to 
the cost of the regional detention basin to be constructed by 
the County. After obtaining the agreement of the developers 
to participtate in the regional detention basin, the City and 
County then failed to move ahead with the actual construction 
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of the regional detention basin. Sid Smith represented to 
David Bird of the Consortium that construction would start on 
the regional detention basin by March of 1986. In fact, no 
work at all was done on the basin and the County did not draw 
up a final agreement until May of 1986. 
The foregoing delays by the County resulted in a six-
month delay of the Bridlewood Project. If the developer had 
been allowed to proceed with the initially agreed upon on-site 
detention basin, the necessary permanent flood control meas-
ures would have been in place in time to substantially reduce 
the damage resulting from the July and August, 1986 storms. 
C. Management of Flood Waters. 
A distinction must be made between "management of 
flood waters" and claims involving water damage. Only if a 
governmental entity can establish that it was involved in the 
actual "management of flood waters" and that damage was caused 
as a result of such management, does the immunity accorded by 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) apply. 
In this case, homeowners assert that flooding did 
occur and that their damage was caused by such flooding. 
However, there is no claim made in any pleading suggesting 
that either Bountiful City or Davis County acted negligently 
in the "management" of the flood waters created by the 
tremendous "100-year" rainfalls. None of the activities 
performed by Davis County and Bountiful City involved the 
"management of flood waters" as anticipated by the statute. 
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If a governmental entity is involved in the actual 
management of flood waters (such as occurred in Salt Lake City 
during the 198 3 spring runoff periods, resulting in massive 
flooding down State Street in Salt Lake City, with resulting 
loss to business entities in the area, property damage to many 
homeowners, etc.) such activities would most likely fall within 
the purview of the statute. The governmental entity is faced 
with a natural disaster which needs to be dealt with in a timely 
and effective manner without concern over potential lawsuits for 
each difficult decision to be made. The situation is similar 
to a governmental entity dealing with a raging fire which is 
spreading rapidly to other buildings. The governmental agency 
may determine to destroy a building "in harms way" to prevent 
further spread of the fire. Such a decision must be made with-
out concern for potential lawsuits resulting from the decision. 
Here, if Bountiful City and Davis County were on the 
property site during the flooding, and decided to dig ditches, 
for example, across the landowner's property to prevent further 
damage, such acts would appear to fall within the purview of 
the Governmental Immunity Act since the activities would be in 
furtherance of the legislative mandated duty to "manage flood 
waters." 
But the decision to require construction of the 
roadway in one phase rather than in three separate phases and 
the requirement that the third-party plaintiffs "tie into" a 
regional detention basin, as opposed to constructing their own 
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on-site facilities, and the corresponding delay in completing 
the regional detention basin cannot be classified as decisions 
involving the "management of flood waters." 
Neither Bountiful City nor Davis County were on the 
property sites during the flooding, and neither entity took 
steps to manage the flood waters. In fact, their only 
involvement at that point was to call the developers. They do 
not, therefore, fall within the purview of the "management of 
flood waters" portion of the statute. 
D. Construction, Repair and Operation of a Flood 
and Storm System. 
Utah Code Annotated §6 3-30-3 (1986) also grants 
governmental entities qualified immunity for acts involving 
the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems. Bountiful City and Davis County did not and were not 
involved in the construction, repair, or operation of flood 
and storm systems on the Bridlewood project. 
It may be helpful to analyze one of the District 
Court cases cited by Bountiful City in support of its motion 
for summary judgment to determine what is meant by "the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems." 
In Larsen v. Brigham City, First Judicial District, Civil No. 
18979, January 31, 1986, an action was brought by a landowner 
for injuries allegedly sustained because of defendant city's 
negligence in constructing earthen dams and drainage ditches 
surrounding the Mantua Reservoir. The plaintiff asserted that 
these structures forced water onto his land. The court held 
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the city to be immune in these circumstances. This case falls 
squarely within the realm of constructing, repairing, or oper-
ating flood and storm control systems. (R. 188-9) 
In contrast, Bountiful City and Davis County did not 
actually physically construct, repair or operate a flood or 
storm system on the Bridlewood project. In the court below, 
Bountiful City purported to define the access road as part of 
the flood and storm system devised by Bountiful City and Davis 
County, thus asserting that the decision to require the con-
struction of the road was encompassed within the grant of 
immunity. Also in the court below, Bountiful City argued that 
"one of the purposes of said streets and the purposes of the 
curbs, gutters, inlet boxes, storm drain lines and storm deten-
tion basins are for the collection and management of storm 
waters." (R. 136) These arguments are misplaced and stretch 
the applicability of the statute to an untenable extent. 
The legislature when enacting the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act surely did not intend to confer immunity on a 
government entity if it merely showed that "one of the purposes" 
or a peripheral result of a particular act or decision impacted 
in some slight manner upon anything having to do with a flood. 
The roadway was not required to be constructed in one section 
to convey storm waters because there was no designated place 
to convey the water to. The regional detention basin was not 
even remotely near existence when the road was cut. Bountiful 
City should not be heard to argue that the decision to con-
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struct the roadway in one section falls within the ambit of 
the phrase "construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems" contained in Utah Code Ann, §63-30-3 (1986)• 
The City and County are trying to define their con-
duct by focusing on the result of the conduct, rather than the 
conduct itself. The fact that their inappropriate and negli-
gent action in requiring the road to be constructed in one phase 
resulted in a flood, cannot be construed to render the decision 
to require construction in one phase a flood control decision. 
Additionally, the requirement imposed by the City and 
the County on the developers obligating them to tie into a 
regional detention basin, rather than proceed with their own 
on-site facilities, and then delaying in getting the regional 
detention system on line, cannot be construed as being 
encompassed within the qualified immunity granted to 
governmental entities involved in the construction, repair 
and operation of flood and storm systems. 
The terms "construction," "repair" and "operation" 
all denote an activity actually undertaken by a governmental 
entity. The requirement that the developers participate in a 
regional detention basin can hardly be termed a construction 
of a storm/flood system or a repair of a storm/flood system or 
even the operation of a storm/flood system. This phrase was 
intended to shield the governmental entity from activities 
actually undertaken, not for requirements imposed upon others. 
If Bountiful City and Davis County are held to be 
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immune for the consequences of a decision that they required 
the developers to carry out, then equity demands that the 
third-party plaintiffs also enjoy comparable immunity. The 
City and County should not be allowed to impose a requirement 
on a private party and then escape the consequences for the 
imposition of that requirement through immunity while the 
private party is held liable to injured third parties for 
damages. Either they both should be held immune, or both 
should not be accorded immunity. 
Further, if this Court applies the governmental immu-
nity provisions to this type of conduct, this Court would 
encourage inaction rather than action in the management of 
flood waters. The City and County "talked about" flood con-
trol measures, but took no action to control flooding until 
after the damage to plaintiffs' residences. 
In Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 
297 N.W. 2d 454 (S.D. 1980), the South Dakota Supreme Court 
was faced with determining whether certain conduct engaged in 
by a governmental entity was entitled to the benefit of govern-
mental immunity under the guise of flood control. South Dakota 
did not have a statutorily enacted governmental immunity act, 
but it adhered to the common law governmental immunity doctrine. 
Sioux Falls Constr. involved an action brought by a 
contractor who had been engaged by Sioux City to build a 
bridge over a diversion channel. After a storm, the city 
failed to open flood gates above the area of construction, 
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which resulted in a substantial amount of the contractor's 
equipment being washed away. The contractor alleged negli-
gence and breach of contract as the basis of the cityfs 
liability. The city countered by claiming that because the 
channels and flood gates were part of a "flood control 
system", the governmental immunity doctrine applied and the 
city was therefore immune from suit. In response to the 
governmental immunity argument, the court stated: 
We agree to the extent that a city is protected 
by governmental immunity from injuries arising 
while it is engaged in the task of controlling 
flood waters. In this case, however, there is 
nothing in the record that would support a 
determination by the trial court that the runoff 
could be denominated a flood. In fact, the 
trial court made no specific determination as 
to the character of the water. That is to say, 
the mere fact that the channel is part of a 
flood control system does not automatically 
render all water going through it flood water. 
We would distinguish between the rampaging 
waters of a river at or near flood stage and 
the ordinary flow of water from runoff. The 
record discloses that the height of the flow 
in the channel rose only some 4-5 feet. In 
dealing with flood waters, city officials are 
making a judicious decision on how best to mini-
mize the possible damages. In that function they 
are entitled to immunity. Viewing, as we must, 
the evidence most favorably to the non-moving 
party, we find nothing in the fact situation 
that would bring the case within that framework. 
We therefore reverse the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the city. _Id. at 457. 
The Sioux Falls Constr. case serves to illustrate the 
fact that the result of conduct should not necessarily operate 
to define the conduct. Bountiful City and Davis County did 
not construct, repair or operate the temporary flood control 
devices employed by the developers at the Bridlewood Project. 
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Requirements were imposed on the developers (which were 
followed) but neither the City nor the County constructed, 
repaired or operated the flood control measures. The fact 
that flood damage occurred does not insulate the City or the 
County from liability. 
E. Summary 
It is not possible to construe the City and County's 
inactivities and activities as falling within the scope of 
flood control activities immunized by Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 
(1986). The City and County are attempting to rely on the 
statute by focusing on the result of the wrongful act, rather 
than on the act itself. The City and County characterize 
their activities as involving flood control decisions. 
However, it would be extremely illogical and wrong to allow 
the result of negligent conduct to define the conduct itself. 
In the present case, it is obvious that if the driver 
of a Bountiful City or Davis County vehicle negligently drove 
the vehicle so as to strike and break an exposed water main 
which then allowed water to flood homes of Davis County 
residents, then neither the City nor the County could claim 
that the actions of the employee were shielded by immunity. 
This is so because one needs to focus on the cause of the 
problem (negligent driving) and not the result of the problem 
(flooding). In this case, the result of the negligence of 
Bountiful City and Davis County may be characterized as 
flooding, but the cause was the commission by the City and 
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County of negligent acts and unwarranted delay for which they 
are entitled to no immunity. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING THE 
ACTIVITIES OF BOUNTIFUL CITY AND DAVIS COUNTY 
AS GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY. 
A. The Actions Taken By Bountiful City and Davis County Do Not 
Constitute Governmental Functions and the Governmental 
Entities Are Therefore Not Entitled to Immunity. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act specifically 
grants governmental entities immunity from suit for any injury 
resulting from the exercise of a governmental function. The 
Utah court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), set forth the reasoning to be util-
ized in determining whether the act in question involves the 
exercise of governmental function. 
[T]he test for determining governmental immunity 
is whether the activity under consideration is of 
such a unique nature that it can only be performed 
by a governmental agency or that it is essential 
to the core of governmental activity. 
This reasoning was confirmed and clarified in a later Utah 
Supreme Court case which stated: 
The first part of the Standiford test—activity 
of such a unique nature that it can only be per-
formed by a governmental agency—does not refer 
to what a government may do, but to what govern-
ment alone must do. . . . [T]he second part of 
the Standiford test—"essential to the core of 
governmental activity"— . . . refers to those 
activities not unique in themselves (and thus not 
qualifying under the first part) but [to those 
activities] essential to the performance of those 
activities that are uniquely governmental. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 775 
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(Utah 1987) (quoting Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981)). 
The activities of Bountiful City and Davis County 
which are at issue, i.e., the requirement that the roadway 
be constructed in one phase rather than in three phases, and 
the requirement that the developers participate in the 
regional detention basin instead of constructing their own 
on-site detention basin, as well as the unwarranted delay in 
getting the regional detention basin on line, clearly do not 
constitute governmental functions. 
In respect to the decision to require the roadway to 
be constructed in one phase, it is clear that such activity 
does not satisfy the first tier of the Standiford test. 
Because the developers cut the roadway themselves, it is clear 
that this activity is not of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency. Secondly, the 
requirement that the roadway be constructed in one phase 
rather than three phases surely cannot be classified as being 
essential to the core of governmental activity. 
The decision requiring the developers to participate 
in a regional detention basin, as opposed to constructing 
their own on-site detention basin, and the unwarranted delay 
in getting the regional basin on line, similarly cannot be 
classified as constituting a governmental function. The con-
struction of a detention basin is not uniquely governmental as 
evidenced by the fact that the developers wished to, and were 
initially led to believe, that they could construct their own 
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on-site detention basin. 
At the trial level, the City and the County argued 
that this definition of governmental function is not applica-
ble in light of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a) (Supp. 1988), 
which has been amended to provide: 
"Governmental function" means any act, failure 
to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a 
governmental entity whether or not the act, fail-
ure to act, operation, function, or undertaking 
is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a 
core governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in dual capacity, essential to or not 
essential to a government or governmental function, 
or could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
This new definition of governmental function is not 
relevant to the instant case. This provision was not effec-
tive until 1987. The activities at issue in this case 
occurred in 1986. The only way in which this definition would 
apply is if the legislature had specifically provided that such 
definition would have retroactive effect, which it failed to do. 
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the Liability Reform Act 
adopted in 1986 would not have retroactive application. The 
court stated: 
The starting point for our analysis is Utah 
Code Ann. §68-3-3, which provides: "No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." The application 
of a statute is retroactive if it alters the 
substantive law on which the parties relied. 
[Citations omitted] Law is substantive 
if it "creates, defines and regulates the 
rights and duties of the parties and . . . may 
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give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished 
from adjective law which pertains to and 
prescribes the practice and procedure or the 
legal machinery by which the substantive law 
is determined or made effective. 1(3, at 953-4. 
In the instant case, the definition of governmental 
function is without doubt a substantive law. The new defini-
tion obviously expands the definition of governmental function 
to include activities which prior case law had excluded. When 
the cause of action in this case arose, the case law defini-
tion of governmental function was applicable. To now require 
the application of the new definition would work a substantial 
change in the relationship between the respective parties. A 
party who under prior law would not be entitled to immunity 
could now conceivably benefit from the grant of immunity. 
Such a result is clearly substantive, therefore this statutory 
definition cannot be retroactively applied. 
B. Even if it is Determined That the Activities of Bountiful 
City and Davis County Constitute Governmental Functions 
Under Case Law, the Statutory Waivers of Immunity Remain 
Applicable. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Bountiful City's and Davis 
County's activities are found to constitute actions that are 
uniquely governmental or essential to the core of governmental 
activity, the existence of governmental immunity is not 
conclusively established. Such a conclusion results merely in 
the classification of the activities as governmental functions 
subject to the express waivers of immunity contained in Utah 
Code Ann. §§63-30-8 through 10.5. 
Except as may otherwise be provided in this 
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chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function . . . Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986). 
1. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused 
by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition 
of any highway, road, street, alley, cross-
walk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986) provides for waiver of 
immunity for injury caused by the defective, unsafe, or dan-
gerous condition of roads, streets, and highways. As a condi-
tion to allowing construction to proceed on the Bridlewood 
Project, Davis County and Bountiful City required the develop-
ers to construct an access road from the top to the bottom of 
the Bridlewood Project. As mentioned above, the developers 
initially intended to construct the road in three phases, but 
the City and County forced them to construct the entire road 
at once. This decision, imposed on the developers, created a 
hazardous and dangerous condition on the road, which resulted 
in the damage sustained by plaintiff-homeowners. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 (1986) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous 
or defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir or other public improve-
ment. Immunity is not waived for latent defec-
tive conditions. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 (1986) provides for waiver of 
immunity for injury from dangerous or defective public 
improvement. In the instant case, the dangerous or defective 
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condition on the Bridlewood Project consisted of the deep cuts 
and denuding of vegetation required for the construction of 
the road. As more fully explained in the proceeding section, 
the actions of Bountiful City and Davis County in requiring 
that the road be constructed in a particular manner 
substantially enhanced the damage to abutting landowners. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (198*6) 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
employment . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1986) provides for waiver 
of immunity for injury caused by a negligent act or omission 
of an employee. Clearly, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the representatives of Bountiful City and 
Davis County were negligent when they delayed development of 
Bridlewood, required construction of the access road over its 
entire length, and forced the developers to forego the 
development of their own on-site detention basin and partici-
pate in a regional basin which was not timely built. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) provides for 
the waiver of immunity for taking or damaging private property 
without compensation. The provision provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of compensa-
tion from the governmental entity when the 
governmental entity has taken or damaged private 
property without just compensation. 
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In the instant case, the actions of Bountiful City 
and Davis County resulted in damage to the property of the 
plaintiffs. This section succinctly establishes liability for 
damages occasioned by the City and County's unreasonable delay 
and negligent instructions and requirements in regard to the 
Bridlewood Project. Because the City and County are 
responsible for at least a percentage of the damage incurred 
by the plaintiffs, the appellants are entitled to join them as 
parties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-41 (1987). 
C. If the Court Concludes That Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 
Applies, the Immunity Granted by That Provision is Not 
Absolute and the Waivers of Immunity Are Still 
Applicable. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 initially states: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function . . . 
The second paragraph proceeds to specify that: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune 
from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities. (Emphasis added) 
Assuming, arguendo, that the activities of Bountiful 
City and Davis County are encompassed within the second para-
graph of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986), that conclusion 
merely results in defining the activity as a governmental 
function which is not synonymous with absolute, unqualified 
immunity. The classification of an operation of a governmen-
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tal entity as a governmental function does not signal uncondi-
tional immunity under this section since the grant of immunity 
is expressly subject to the operation of other sections of 
the Act. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980). 
It is incongruous to accept Bountiful City's and 
Davis County's argument for a potentially boundless construc-
tion of the phrases "management of flood waters" and 
"construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems" and also accept the City's and County's arguments 
that this immunity is absolute and not subject to the waiver 
provisions of the act. If absolute immunity was intended, the 
Legislature would have termed it absolute immunity rather than 
a governmental function which in the preceding paragraph they 
had defined as being subject to certain enumerated waivers. 
Therefore, it does not make any difference if the status of 
governmental function is reached pursuant to the application 
of case law, or through activity defined as the "management of 
the flood waters" or the "construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems." If the activity is determined to 
be a governmental function, then it is subject to the waivers 
of immunity discussed previously. Several waiver provisions, 
as noted in the prior section, are relevant in this action. 
D. Summary 
Several alternative theories are set forth in Point 
II, any one of which precludes the conclusion that Bountiful 
City and Davis County are immune from liability in this 
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action. First, because the activities of the City and County 
do not constitute the "management of flood waters" or "the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems)", such activities must be analyzed pursuant to case 
law to determine whether the activities qualify as 
governmental functions. The definition of governmental 
function is "whether the activity under consideration is of 
such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity." The activities of the City and 
County, which are the subject of the third-party complaint, 
do not fall within such a definition. 
Second, even if the activities of Bountiful City and 
Davis County are accorded governmental function status under 
case law, the express waivers of immunity in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act operate to negate Bountiful City's 
and Davis County's defense of governmental immunity. 
Third, if the Court concludes that the activities of 
Bountiful City and Davis County do fall within the scope of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986), that conclusion merely results 
in the classification of such activities as governmental func-
tions subject to the express waivers of immunity contained in 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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POINT III. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30-3 (1986) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah State Constitution 
states that: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 Immunity of Governmental 
Entities From Suit is in derogation of that constitutional 
provision. This statute provides in pertinent part: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are con-
sidered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
From the face of the statutory provision, it is apparent that 
the immunity given to governmental entities may be used to 
shield governmental agencies from liability for compensation 
in situations squarely within the purview of Article I, 
Section 22. For example, if a governmental entity damaged the 
property of a private landowner in the course of constructing 
a storm drainage system, under the District Court's view of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986), the government could 
conceivably assert that it is immune from liability. This is 
the type of uncompensated damage to private property 
occasioned by a governmental entity in pursuit of a public use 
that Article I, Section 22 was designed to protect against. 
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In this case, the actions of Bountiful City and Davis 
County caused damage to homeowners' property• The City and 
County assert that their actions in relation to the Bridlewood 
Project concerned the management of flood waters and that they 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
those activities. Section 6 3-30-3 defines the management of 
flood waters as a governmental function. The very essence of 
the definition of a governmental function is an action taken 
for the benefit of the public. Thus, any property taken or 
damaged as a result of the exercise of a governmental function 
is property taken for a public use. 
Whether or not Article I, Section 22 establishes a 
cause of action has been analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the past. The main focus of these opinions is whether the 
state has waived its immunity to suit for actions instituted 
pursuant to Article I, Section 22. There are Utah cases which 
stand for the proposition that sovereign immunity protects 
governmental entities from suits brought for the purpose of 
obtaining compensation for the taking or damaging of private 
property for public use because Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution is not self-executing so as to constitute a 
waiver of that immunity. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 
10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); Fairclough v. Salt Lake 
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960); and State Road 
Comm'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962). 
However, these cases are not well reasoned and have been 
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sharply criticized. See for example Justice Wade's stinging 
dissent in Fairclough and Judge Thomas Greene's decision in 
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986). 
Other cases decided by this Court which have never 
been distinguished or overruled are persuasive. In State-by-
State Road Comm'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 
94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), this Court recognized that 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be enforced by its 
citizens. In discussing the application of Article I, Section 
22, this Court stated: 
We think it is clear that the framers of the 
Constitution did not intend to give the 
rights granted by section 22, and then leave 
the citizen powerless to enforce such rights. 
We hold that this is so whether the injury 
complained of by the plaintiffs in the injunc-
tion suit is considered a "taking" of property, 
or a "damaging" of property. The framers of 
the fundamental law, after much debate and 
careful consideration of the hardship of the 
old rule which allowed compensation only in 
the case of a taking of property, wrote into 
the Constitution a provision by which we think 
they intended to guarantee to the landowner 
whose property is damaged just compensation 
with the same certainty as to the landowner 
whose property is physically taken. 7 8 P.2d 
at 508. [Emphasis added] 
See also, Gray v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 204, 138 P. 
1177 (1914) (cited with approval by the Federal District Court 
of Utah in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Webber v. 
Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 (1911). Gray and 
Webber stand for exactly the same proposition as does State-
by-State Road Commission, namely that the rights guaranteed by 
the state Constitution ought to be enforceable by state citizens. 
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In 1986, Judge Thomas Greene decided Katsos v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., supra. He held that actions for inverse con-
demnation are recognized and cognizable without enabling 
legislation. He held that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution .Ls self-executing. In so holding, Judge Greene 
distinguished Fairclough and cited Gray with approval. Judge 
Greene stated: 
Defendants1 primary reliance [on Fairclough] 
appears to be on the statement by the Utah 
Supreme Court that the Utah Constitution 
[Article I, Section 22] is not "self-executing," 
but it is evident from the case that the court 
was most concerned with the fact that the state 
had not given its consent to be sued. The 
statute which arguably waives sovereign immunity 
was enacted after Fairclough. Moreover, it is 
apparent that actions for inverse condemnation 
are recognized and cognizable in the State of 
Utah without enabling legislation. See Gray 
v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 204, 138 Pac. 1177 
(1914). Defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment as to this claim is denied. 
Clearly, it would not be consistent with a constitu-
tional form of government to embody basic rights within the 
framework of the Constitution, but to hold that these rights 
were ineffectual unless the Legislature enacts legislation 
specifically recognizing those rights. 
Because the Utah Constitution is the supreme law of 
the state of Utah, the Legislature has no power or authority 
to enact laws contrary to or at odds with the Constitution. 
If §6 3-30-3 is read to provide immunity to Davis County and 
Bountiful City in this case, 63-30-3 is in direct conflict 
with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
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Accordingly, 6 3-30-3 should be declared unconstitutional. 
Also, it appears that the Utah legislature has recog-
nized the apparent conflict between Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 
(1986) and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and 
specifically enacted Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) 
to remedy the situation. Section 6 3-30-10.5 entitled Wavier 
of Immunity For Taking Private Property Without Compensation, 
states: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property without just 
compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
according to the requirements of Chapter 34, 
Title 78. 
The language in the initial sentence is strikingly 
similar to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
which states "Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." Clearly, the 
waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-10.5 makes Utah Code 
Ann. §6 3-30-3 inapplicable in circumstances which would be in 
conflict with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Obviously, the only logical interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is that the immunity bestowed is 
qualified rather than absolute. Any other reasoning would 
place the statute and the constitutional provision hopelessly 
in conflict. (See supra, Point II, C). If the immunity is 
termed absolute, the waiver provision could not operate to 
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save the Utah Governmental Immunity Act from constitutional 
attack. 
Under the cloak of governmental immunity, which has 
been ever-increasing in coverage, the state and its political 
subdivisions can effectively negate the purpose of Article I, 
Section 22. Whenever property is negligently damaged pursuant 
to a governmental function (public use), cities and counties 
should be required to pay compensation pursuant to the consti-
tutional provision. The constitutional provision contained in 
Article I, Section 22 is negated if cities and counties are 
relieved from such liability through the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. This places Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 squarely in 
conflict with an express constitutional provision and there-
fore §6 3-30-3 should be declared unconstitutional. 
POINT IV. 
TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE UTAH 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, THE FAULT OF ALL 
TORTFEASORS MUST BE COMPARED. GRANTING 
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WOULD MAKE THAT 
COMPARISON IMPOSSIBLE. 
The Utah Comparative Fault Act requires the fault of 
all parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial in order 
for the fault of the respective parties to be accurately 
apportioned. This result is mandated even if the City and 
County are held to be immune and thus not required to 
monetarily compensate the plaintiff-homeowners. Two of Utah's 
comparative fault statutes merit special attention. These are 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1987) and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40 
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(1987). 
§78-27-38 Comparative Negligence, . . . 
However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant, 
§78-27-40. Amount of Liability Limited 
to Proportion of Fault—No Contribution, 
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or pro-
portion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
No defendant is entitled to contribution from 
any other person. 
To effectuate the purpose of these two provisions, it is crit-
ical that the actions of both Bountiful City and Davis County 
be taken into account by the trier of fact. If the City and 
County are released from this action, and assuming that the 
landowners and developers are found to be liable to the 
homeowners, it is obvious that the landowners and developers 
will be assessed a damage award that is in excess of the 
proportion of fault actually attributable to them. 
The 1986 Comparative Negligence Act abolished the 
doctrine of joint and several liability in Utah. Releasing 
the City and County from this action will effectively subject 
third-party plaintiffs to joint and several liability. This 
certainly does not appear to be the intent of the Legislature. 
Obviously, the Legislature intended that no party be held 
responsible for more than his pro-rata share of overall fault. 
Fairness dictates that the fault of Davis County and Bountiful 
City simply must be compared on the special verdict form sub-
mitted to the jury. 
-40-
Other jurisdictions which have examined this issue 
have held that all parties1 proportion of fault must be ascer-
tained by the trier of fact even if a party cannot be held 
legally responsible for his proportion of fault. An early case 
espousing this view is Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978). 
In Brown, the owner of an automobile involved in an 
intersectional accident while being driven by his son, sued the 
other driver to recover for damages sustained to his vehicle. 
Apparently, prior to this action, the defendant had settled 
with the driver, (the son) out of court. In this proceeding, 
she did not seek to have the son joined as an additional for-
mal party to the action. The trier of fact found that the 
owner was 0% negligent, his son was 90% negligent, and the 
defendant was 10% negligent. The defendant's vehicle sustained 
$5,42 3 in damages; therefore the trial court entered judgment 
for the plaintiff for 10% of that amount, i.e., $542.30. 
Thus, the issue was whether it was appropriate to 
ascertain the proportion of fault of a party not formally 
joined to the action. The court held that, ff[T]he intent and 
purpose of the legislature in adopting K.S.A. 60-258a [the 
Kansas Comparative Negligence Act] was to impose individual 
liability for damages based on the proportionate fault of all 
parties to the occurrence which gave rise to the injuries and 
damages even though one or more parties cannot be joined for-
mally as a litigant or be held legally responsible for his or 
her proportionate fault." Id. at 876. As a prelude to this 
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holding, the court discussed the policy considerations appli-
cable in reaching this determination. The court stated: 
There is nothing inherently fair about a 
defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% 
of the loss, and there is no social policy 
that should compel defendants to pay more 
than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs 
now take the parties as they find them. If 
one of the parties at fault happens to be a 
spouse or a governmental agency and if by 
reason of some competing social policy the 
plaintiff cannot receive payment for his 
injuries from the spouse or agency, there is 
no compelling social policy which requires the 
codefendant to pay more than his fair share 
of the loss. IcL at 874. 
An additional Kansas case that deals with this issue 
is Wilson v. Probst, 581 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1978). In Wilson, a 
passenger of a vehicle brought an action for injuries 
sustained in a vehicular collision. The motorist of the vehi-
cle in which the plaintiff was not a passenger joined the 
Secretary of Transportation as an additional party defendant 
based on the state's alleged negligence concerning the claimed 
highway defects. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the 
Secretary of Transportation was immune from liability based on 
negligence. Thus, the issue arose as to whether the other 
defendants to the lawsuit were entitled to have the negligence 
of the Secretary of Transportation taken into account in 
determining their proportionate share of liability. 
The court quoted Brown v. Keill for the proposition 
that the proportion of fault of all parties to the occurrence 
must be taken into account even though one or more of the par-
ties cannot be joined formally as a litigant or be held 
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legally responsible for his or her proportionate fault. The 
court went on to state, "In the context of comparative 
negligence, highway defects claimed to have contributed to the 
occurrence from which the injuries and damages arose must be 
compared to the alleged negligence of other parties if the 
intent of K.S.A. 60-258a is to be accomplished." Id. at 384. 
The court then resolved the issue of whether the 
Secretary of Transportation must remain as a named party to 
the action or whether the trial court could enter an order 
allowing his percentage of negligence to be ascertained by the 
jury but dismissing him as a party for other purposes since no 
ultimate liability could be established against him. The court 
held that an additional party defendant in a comparative negli-
gence action may not be dismissed from an action solely because 
of his immunity. 1^ 3. at 384. Therefore, the court required 
that the Secretary of Transportation remain as a named party 
in the action to adequately apportion the respective fault. 
This type of apportionment has also been held to apply 
in instances in which the identity of the alleged concurrent 
tortfeasor was unknown. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding 
Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. App. 1982), an action was 
brought arising out of an automobile accident involving three 
vehicles. The driver of one of the cars involved in the 
accident was unknown. The jury found the defendant to be 30% 
at fault and found the unknown driver to be 70% at fault. The 
New Mexico court utilized this opinion to hold that the concept 
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of joint and several liability was not retained with the adop-
tion of comparative negligence. The court therefore affirmed 
the jury's apportionment of liability for the damages sustained 
by the plaintiff though the unknown driver was not a party to 
the action and such a finding in essence precluded the plain-
tiff from receiving compensation for 70% of his damages. The 
court stated: 
Joint and several liability is not to be re-
tained in our pure comparative negligence system 
on the basis that a plaintiff must be favored. 
We hold that defendant is not liable for the 
entire damage caused by defendant and the 
unknown driver. Defendant, as a concurrent 
tortfeasor, is not liable on a theory of joint 
and several liability. Id. at 586. 
Workmen's compensation presents another area in which 
the fact finder is entitled to apportion the respective negli-
gence of all parties involved in the dispute even if one party 
cannot be held liable to the plaintiff by operation of law. 
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660 
(Wise. 1975), is illustrative of this point. Connar concerned 
an appeal brought to ascertain whether it was proper to 
exclude from the special verdict form a question relating to 
the negligence of the employer, when the employer was not a 
party to the negligence action and could not be held liable by 
reason of the exclusivity of the workmen's compensation 
remedy. In holding that it was proper to ask the jury to con-
sider the negligence of the employer, the court stated: 
It is established without doubt that, when 
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the 
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opportunity to consider the negligence of all 
parties to the transaction, whether or not 
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or 
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to 
the other tortfeasors either by operation of law 
or because of a prior release. . . . At the 
requested-special-verdict stage of a lawsuit, 
it is immaterial that the entity is not a 
party or is immune from further liability. 
[Citations omitted] [T]he apportionment must 
include all whose negligence may have contri-
buted to the arising of the cause of action. 
Id. at 662. 
The Idaho court adopted this rule in Pocatello Ind. 
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980). The 
Idaho court stated that, "The reason for such [a rule] is that 
true apportionment cannot be achieved unless that apportionment 
includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either 
causing or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether 
or not they are parties to the case." IcL at 403, quoting Heft 
& Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual §8.131, at 12 (1978). 
The Idaho court also noted that apparently only Florida has 
adopted a contrary position. Other cases espousing this view-
point include Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 
1986); Couch v. Thomas, 497 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio App. 1985). 
The treatises which discuss this issue are in accord 
in concluding that the better reasoned approach is to require 
the negligence of all concurrent tortfeasors, whether they are 
parties to the action or not, to be taken into account by the 
jury in apportioning liability. 
It is accepted practice to include all tort-
feasors in the apportionment question. This 
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includes nonparties who may be unknown tort-
feasors, phantom drivers, and persons alleged 
to be negligent but not liable in damages to 
the injured party such as in the third-party 
cases arising in the workmen's compensation 
area. Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence 
Manual, §8.100, at 14 (Rev. Ed.) 
See also, Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, at 262-3 (2d Ed. 
1986) . 
Numerous other authorities can be cited in support of 
this proposition. See also, American Motorcycle Assn. v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 578 P.2d 899 (Ca. 1978); 
Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978); Barron v. United 
States, 473 F.Supp. 1077 (D. Haw. 1979), affd. in part and 
revfd in part 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981). 
In summation, it is evident that the respective neg-
ligence of Bountiful City and Davis County must be apportioned 
by the finder of fact in order to comply with the stated pur-
pose of the Utah Comparative Fault Act. This is mandated 
even if Bountiful City and Davis County are found to be immune 
from liability to the plaintiff-homeowners. The only question 
remaining is whether to require Bountiful City and Davis 
County to remain as parties to the action or whether to merely 
require that the jury assess their respective negligence on 
the special verdict form and reduce the liability, if any, of 
the landowners and developers accordingly. The interests of 
accuracy and equity compel the conclusion that Bountiful City 
and Davis County should remain as named parties to the action. 
This will facilitate a more in depth development of the evi-
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dence to aid the trier of fact in reaching a just result. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal involves several issues regarding the 
construction, application and constitutionality of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. In regard to the construction of 
the Act, landowners and developers submit to this Court that 
the trial court erred in classifying Bountiful City's and 
Davis County's actions as involving the "management of flood 
waters" or the "construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems." The activities of Bountiful City and 
Davis County which are at issue concern unwarranted delays and 
negligent decision making. These activities are not granted 
immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986). The mere 
fact that these activities resulted in a flood will not, or 
should not, place them within the confines of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3 (1986). 
Second, the acts and omissions of Davis County and 
Bountiful City do not constitute a governmental function as 
defined by applicable case law or statutory law and therefore 
no immunity applies. Even if the activities of the City and 
County were found to be a governmental function, immunity has 
been waived for those acts by express statutory waivers. Also, 
even were one to conclude that the conduct of Bountiful City 
and Davis County constituted a governmental function in the 
sense that those acts and omissions consisted of "the manage-
ment of flood waters and/or the construction repair or operation 
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of flood and storm systems," such a finding would only result 
in qualified immunity rather than an absolute grant of immunity. 
Such qualified immunity is overridden by the express statutory 
waivers contained in §§63-30-8, 9, 10 and 10.5. 
Third, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is unconstitu-
tional in light of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act could arguably be 
applied in situations where the government takes or damages 
property pursuant to a public use. The constitutional provi-
sion requires compensation in such instances, but the 
Governmental Immunity Act could operate to extinguish the 
governmental entities' liability. 
Fourth, even if §63-30-3 is found to be constitu-
tional, and Bountiful City and Davis County are found to be 
immune, the purpose and the language of the Comparative Fault 
Act require that their respective fault be apportioned by the 
jury at the special verdict phase. To not allow such a result 
would effectively subject third-party plaintiffs to joint and 
several liability which has been statutorily abolished in 
Utah. The clear majority of jurisdictions which have examined 
the issue of apportionment of fault when a party cannot be 
held legally responsible for his percentage of fault or is not 
a party to the lawsuit, have held that the immune or absent 
party's liability must be apportioned by the jury at the 
special verdict phase. This result is necessary in order to 
insure that the defendant who is present is not held liable 
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for more than his proportionate degree of fault. 
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of the 
trial court be reversed, the third-party claims be reinstated, 
and the entire case be remanded for trial. 
DATED this 3 ) day of <Ja*{lnry , 1989. 
STRONG^ HAH 
BY. 
Rqpert A. Burton 
Attorneys for Appellants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs Landforms Construction 
Group, Landforms Development, Inc. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
By< rC^iOUl \A A^~»^>^ 
Lowell V. Smith 
Attorneys for Appellants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs Mark S. Sandberg, 
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd 
Investment Group, a general partnership, 
and Hale/Redd Land Investment, a joint 
venture 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY, MARK 
& TERESIA PANTELAKIS; DENNIS & 
GLORIA ANDERSON; JAMES & LINDA 
STOVER; DAVID C. FRICKE; BARRIE 
D. & KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD & 
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA 
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE 
LARAINE GORDON; and S. MICHAEL 
& SANDRA J. INMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.; 
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT INC.; 
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE 
REDD; LYLE A. HALE; 
HALE/REDD INVESTMENT GROUP, a 
general partnership a/k/a REDD 
HALE INVESTMENT GROUP; 
HALE/REDD LAND INVESTMENT, a 
joint venture; VERL G. SMART; 
and THE CONSORTIUM, INC., 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 40616 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
flUtfft 
LANDPORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.; : 
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE : 
REDD; LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General : 
Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE : 
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD : 
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint : 
venture, s 
: 
Third-Party Plaintiffs,: 
v. : 
BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS COUNTY,: 
Third-Party Defendants.: 
Third-Party Defendants Bountiful City and Davis Countyfs 
Motions for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on September 6, 1988. Third-Party Plaintiff 
Bountiful City was represented by Layne B. Forbes, City Attorney. 
Third-Party Defendant Davis County was represented by Gerald E. 
Hess, Chief Civil Deputy Attorney for Davis County. Third-Party 
Plaintiff Landforms Construction Corporation, Landforms 
Development, Inc. were represented by Attorney Robert A. Burton. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. 
Hale, Hale/Redd Investment Group, Hale/Redd Land Investment were 
represented by Attorney Lowell V. Smith. 
Having considered and reviewed the pleadings, affidavits 
and Memorandums of Points and Authorities on file, and being 
fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes: 
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1. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-3, the 
Governmental Immunity Act ("Act"), grants absolute immunity to 
the management of flood water and other natural disasters and 
grants immunity in the construction, repair and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities. 
2. Count I of the Amended Third-Party Complaint 
against Bountiful City and Davis County alleges that all flood 
and storm control work performed by Third-Party Plaintiffs was 
done in accordance with Davis County and Bountiful City 
requirements and was done with the approval of Davis County and 
Bountiful City; that Third-Party Plaintiffs were prevented from 
constructing their own storm detention basin by the negligent and 
careless actions of Bountiful City and Davis County; that 
Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed making a 
decision concerning the construction of a regional storm 
detention basin and that such delay affected the ability of 
Third-Party Plaintiffs to construct their own, on-site detention 
basin; and that Bountiful City and Davis County required 
Third-Party Plaintiffs to construct a roadway through the entire 
development project, which roadway operated as a funnel or 
channel for the water, mud and silt which caused the plaintiffs1 
damages. The Amended Third-Party Complaint seeks 
indemnification, contribution and/or a comparison of fault 
between Third-Party Plaintiffs and Third-Party Defendants. 
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3. Count II of the Amended Third-Party Complaint 
seeks recovery from Davis County pursuant to a contract whereby 
Davis County was obligated to construct a regional detention 
basin. It is alleged that the regional detention basin was not 
timely constructed and that the damages sustained by plaintiffs 
were the proximate result of the alleged breach of contract by 
Davis County. 
4. The immunity granted by the Act extends to the 
acts, or the failure to do the acts, of planning, designing, 
constructing, repairing and operating or managing flood waters 
and other natural disasters and in the constructing, repairing 
and operating of flood and storm systems before, during or after 
an actual flood emergency. 
5. With the exception of Count II of the Amended 
Third-Party Complaint against Davis County, all acts and 
omissions of Davis County and Bountiful City upon which Third-
Party Plaintiffs seek to rely to impose liability upon Bountiful 
City and Davis County are shielded by the broad grant of immunity 
contained in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
6. The Court determines there is no just reason for 
delay and, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court hereby directs the entry of a final judgment 
as set forth below. 
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WHEREFORE/ it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. On the basis of governmental immunity as contained 
in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated/ Third-Party Defendant 
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby 
granted and the Amended Third-Party Complaint of Third-Party 
Plaintiffs be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits* Final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Third-Party 
Defendant Bountiful City and against Third-Party Plaintiffs, no 
cause of action, with each party to bear his or its own costs. 
2. On the basis of governmental immunity as contained 
in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated/ Third-Party Defendant 
Davis Countyfs Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby 
granted as to Count One of the Amended Third-Party Complaint and 
Count One of the Amended Third-Party Complaint be and hereby is 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. Final judgment as 
to the claims set forth in Count One of the Amended Third-Party 
Complaint is hereby entered in favor of Third-Party Defendant 
Davis County and against Third-Party Plaintiffs, no cause of 
action/ with each party to bear his or its own costs. 
3. Third-Party Defendant Davis County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Count Two of the Amended Third-Party 
Complaint is hereoy denied/ provided/ however/ that the only 
issues remaining as to Count Two are as to whether or not there 
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was any breach by Davis County of the Agreement dated May 12, 
1986, between Davis County and the Hale/Redd Investment, and the 
damages, if any, sustained after January 12, 1987. 
Odr 
DATED this ||1^ day of Scptcmbo-g, 1988. 
BY THE COORT: 
Approved as to Form: 
LA^NE'B. £0#BES~ 
Attorney for Bountiful City 
IRAL&-E". HESS 
Attorney for Davis County 
ROBERT A^TBURTON 
Attorney for Landform Construction 
Corp. and Landforms Development, Inc. 
o-
LOWELL V. SMITH 
Attorney for Mark S. Sandberg, 
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, 
Hale/Redd Investment Group, and 
Hale/Redd Land Investment 
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 
Telephone: (801) 
IN T ra^si SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
JSI ATE -&F~&EMt~-
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY, MARK & 
TERESIA PANTELAKIS; DENNIS & 
GLORIA ANDERSON; JAMES & LINDA 
STOVER; DAVID C. FRICKE; BARRIE 
D. & KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD & 
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA 
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE LARAINE 
GORDON; and S. MICHAEL & SANDRA 
J. INMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.; 
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT INC.; 
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD; 
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a general 
PARTNERSHIP, a/k/a REDD HALE 
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD LAND 
INVESTMENT, a joint venture; 
VERL G. SMART; and THE 
CONSORTIUM, INC., 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 40616 
Plaintiffs complain against defendants and allege as 
follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs William & Judy McCleery are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 329 West 3500 
South, Bountiful, Utah. 
2. Plaintiffs Mark & Teresia Pantelakis are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 388 West Davis 
Boulevard, Bountiful, Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs Dennis & Gloria Anderson are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 3737 Monarch 
Drive, Bountiful, Utah* 
4. Plaintiffs James & Linda Stover are residents of Davis 
County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned 
and resided on the real property located 482 West 3600 South, 
Bountiful, Utah. 
5. Plaintiffs David C. Fricke was a resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned 
and resided on the real property located at 3647 South Carriage 
Lane, Bountiful, Utah. 
6. Plaintiffs Barrie D. & Katherine Brewer are residents 
of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 447 West 3500 
South, Bountiful, Utah. 
7. Plaintiffs Ronald & Kerma Jones are residents of Davis 
County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned 
and resided on the real property located at 357 West Davis 
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Boulevard, Bountiful, Utah. 
8. Plaintiffs Richard & Barbara Kristensen are residents 
of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 3302 South 300 
West, Bountiful, Utah. 
9. Plaintiffs Lyle and Alice Laraine Gordon are residents 
of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein 
owned and resided on the real property located at 3326 South 300 
West, Bounti ful, Utah. 
10. Plaintiffs S. Michael and Sandra J. Inman are 
residents of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times 
mentioned herein owned and resided on the real property located 
at 3301 South 350 West, Bountiful, Utah. 
11. Defendant Landforms Construction Corp. is a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Bountiful, 
Utah. 
12. Landforms Development Inc. is a Utah corporation with 
its principal place of business in Bountiful, Utah. 
13. Defendants Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd and Lyle A. 
Hale have been residents of Davis County, Utah, during all times 
mentioned herein. 
14. Defendant Hale/Redd Investment Group a/k/a Redd Hale 
Investment Group is a general partnership, made up of defendants 
Redd, Sandberg and Lyle A. Hale as partners, and has been doing 
business in Davis County, Utah. 
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15. Defendant Hale/Redd Land Investment is a joint venture 
made up of some or all of the above defendants, and has been 
doing business in Davis County, Utah. 
16. Defendant Verl G. Smart has been a resident of Davis 
County, Utah, and/or has owned a part of the property in Davis 
County which is described below. 
17. Defendant The Consortium, Inc. is a Utah corporation, 
with its principal place of business in Davis County, Utah. 
18. At all times material hereto, defendants and each of 
them worked in concert or as agents of the other. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
19. Defendants have owned an interest in and/or have been 
involved and participated in the planning, development and 
construction of improvements on large parcels of real property 
situated above plaintiffs1 respective residences. This real 
property shall be referred to hereafter as "the Real Property.11 
20. Through their acts and omissions, defendants 
negligently and carelessly planned, designed, developed and 
constructed the Real Property improvements and in so doing 
changed the natural conditions and contour of the property, 
thereby increasing, aggravating, concentrating and diverting the 
natural flow of runoff water from the property. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and 
carelessness of defendants, plaintiffs have suffered substantial 
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flooding damages to their residences and personal property in an 
amount to be established at the time of trial. As a further 
cause of defendants1 negligence and carelessness, plaintiffs have 
suffered a devaluation in their property and have suffered other 
consequential and general damages in excess of Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($500,000). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass) 
22. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 23 above. 
23. The wrongful actions and omissions of defendants in 
allowing excessive and substantial runoff water to flood 
plaintiffs1 properties on numerous different occasions since 
December, 1985, constitutes unlawful trespasses. 
24. As a direct and proximate result of defendants1 
unlawful trespasses, plaintiffs are entitled to recover against 
defendants all special, consequential and general damages in an 
amount in excess of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000). 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Nuisance) 
25. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 
26. The instances of flooding caused by the wrongful 
actions and omissions of the defendants have occurred on numerous 
occasions since December, 1985, as recent as August, 1987, and 
plaintiffs believe and therefore allege that the actions of 
defendants and the conditions on the Real Property in question 
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have not been corrected and will continue to result in more 
flooding each time there is significant rainfall. 
27. The wrongful actions and omissions of defendants have 
substantially interfered with plaintiffs1 use and enjoyment of 
their property and therefore constitute a continuing nuisance. 
28. On numerous occasions, plaintiffs have given notice to 
defendants of their wrongful conduct and have made demand that 
the unsafe conditions be corrected; but defendants have failed 
and refused to abate said nuisance. Plaintiffs are therefore 
threatened by the continuing nuisance through an indefinite time 
in the future. 
29. Unless the unsafe conditions caused by the wrongful 
conduct of defendants are corrected, plaintiffs will suffer 
additional damages. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a 
permanent injunction restraining defendants from continuing the 
nuisance herein described and requiring defendants to abate the 
nuisance to avoid additional great and irreparable injury to 
plaintiffs and their properties. 
30. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful 
conduct of the defendants which constitute the maintenance of a 
nuisance, plaintiffs have sustained special and consequential 
damages as described above. In addition, plaintiffs have 
suffered great emotional trauma in being subjected to multiple 
floodings of their personal residence and belongings and have 
suffered other general damages, for which defendants are liable. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
31. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
32. Defendants have personally witnessed and have otherwise 
been put on notice of the numerous floodings and damages 
resulting therefrom since December. 1985, however, defendants 
have failed to take reasonable precautions and measures to 
correct the unsafe conditions. By failing to correct such unsafe 
conditions, defendants knew or reasonably should have known that 
additional flooding would occur to plaintiffs and that flooding 
would cause plaintiffs severe emotional distress. 
33. Defendants wrongful actions and omissions have been 
outrageous and would constitute the intentional infliction of 
distress to the plaintiffs, for which defendants are liable for 
all special, consequential and general damages resulting 
therefrom. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Punitive Damages) 
34. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 35 above. 
35. As a result of defendants1 wrongful actions and 
omissions, defendants have acted maliciously and wantonly and in 
complete disregard for the rights and safety of plaintiffs. 
36. In order to deter such conduct of defendants in the 
future and prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by way 
of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray that exemplary 
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damages be awarded in the amount of at least Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($500,000). 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against 
defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
1. For all special damages to be proven at the time of 
trial; 
2. For consequential damages to be proven at the time of 
trial; 
3. For general damages in an amount in excess of Five 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000); 
4. For exemplary and punitive damages in the amount of at 
least Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000); 
5. For prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and court 
costs; 
6. For a permanent injunction, restraining defendants 
from the described wrongful conduct and requiring defendants to 
correct the unsafe conditions as described above; and 
7. For all other relief deemed equitable and just under 
the circumstances. 
DATED this /^ciav of October, 1987. 
Christensen, Jenqen 
By:,.^V 
J^l*. Ricli Humpherys ^// 
Attorney for Plaintriffs (/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this fq"^  day of October, 1987, to: 
Robert A. Burton 
Strong & Hanni 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS LANDFORM 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
<7~ ^ ^ 
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Lr:3 AUG 24 AM 9= 38 
Robert A. Burton, #0516 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Landforms 
Construction Group, 
Landforms Development, Inc., 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Mark S. Sandberg, 
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, 
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a 
general partnership, a/k/a Redd 
Hale Investment Group, Hale/Redd 
Land Investment, a joint venture 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 36 3-7611 
.• <a:** 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY; 
MARK & TERESA PANTELAKIS; 
DENNIS & GLORIA ANDERSON; 
JAMES & LINDA STOVER; DAVID 
C. FRICKE; BARRIE D. & 
KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD & 
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA 
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE 
LARAINE GORDON; and S. MICHAEL 
& SANDRA J. INMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.; 
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.; 
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD; 
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General 
AMENDED CROSSCLAIM AND 
AMENDED THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 40616 
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Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE 
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD 
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint 
venture; VERL G. SMART; and 
THE CONSORTIUM, INC., 
Defendants. 
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.; 
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD; 
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General 
Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE 
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD 
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint 
venture, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS 
COUNTY, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
AMENDED CROSSCLAIM 
Defendants Landforrns Construction Corp., Landforms 
Development, Inc., Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, 
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a general partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale 
Investment Group and Hale/Redd Land Investment, a joint venture, 
crossclaim against co-defendant The Consortium, Inc. and allege as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have commenced an action in the above-
entitled court by virtue of an Amended Complaint, dated October 
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19, 1987, wherein plaintiffs allege that these defendants are 
liable to plaintiffs for damages. 
2. In their Amended Complaint plaintiffs have also set 
forth claims against The Consortium, Inc. 
3. These defendants deny liability to plaintiffs. 
4. These defendants allege that engineering and design 
work on the property in question was performed by The Consortium. 
5. The Consortium also rendered professional advice and 
counsel to these defendants regarding temporary storm detention 
facilities. 
6. In the event the engineering and design work was 
negligently performed, or the professional advice and counsel was 
negligently given, the responsibility for this negligence rests 
with The Consortium and not these defendants. 
7. In the event these defendants are found liable to 
plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then said 
liability would be passive, secondary and substitute in nature, 
whereas the liability of The Consortium would be primary and 
active in nature. Therefore, in such event, these defendants and 
counterclalmants are entitled to be fully indemnified and recover 
judgment over against The Consortium for the full amount of any 
judgment rendered against these defendants in favor of plaintiffs, 
together with all costs and attorney's fees incurred by these 
defendants. 
r A 
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8. In the alternative and in the event these defendants 
are found to be jointly liable with The Consortium for damages 
allegedly sustained by plaintiffs, and thus under the circum-
stances not entitled to complete indemnity, then these defendants 
are entitled to contribution from The Consortium in accordance 
with the Utah comparative negligence statutes in effect when 
plaintiffs first began to complain of damages, 
9. Pursuant to §78-27-37 et seq. [Utah Code Annotated 
(1986)], these defendants are entitled to have the fault of The 
Consortium determined on the special verdict submitted to the 
jury, and any fault found to rest with The Consortium should 
reduce the liability, if any, of these defendants to plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE, in the event these defendants should be found 
liable to plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then 
these defendants demand judgment against co-defendant The 
Consortium as follows: 
(1) Full and complete indemnity. 
(2) Contribution. 
(3) Comparison of fault of all parties pursuant to 
current comparative fault statutes. 
(4) Costs of court and such other and further relief as 
to the court seems just and equitable. 
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AMENDED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Defendants and third-party plaintiffs Landforms 
Construction Corp., Landforms Development, Inc., Mark S. Sandberg, 
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd Investment Group, a general 
partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale Investment Group and Hale/Redd Land 
Investment, a joint venture, complain of Bountiful City and Davis 
County and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have commenced an action in the above-
entitled court by virtue of an Amended Complaint dated October 19, 
1987, wherein plaintiffs allege that these defendants are liable 
to plaintiffs for damages. 
2. These defendants and third-party plaintiffs reallege 
and incorporate by reference herein the jurisdictional 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 of plaintiffs1 
Amended Complaint. 
3. Third-party plaintiffs deny liability to plaintiffs. 
COUNT I 
4. Third-party plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by 
reference herein paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Third-Party 
Complaint. 
5. All flood and storm control work performed by third-
party plaintiffs or their contractors on the Bridlewood 
Subdivision was done in accordance with Davis County and 
Bountiful City requirements with the approval of Davis County and 
Bountiful City- If the work was negligently performed, which 
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third-party plaintiffs deny, this was because Bountiful City and 
Davis County requirements were deficient. 
6. Third-party plaintiffs were prevented from 
developing their own storm detention basin by the negligent and 
careless actions of Bountiful City and Davis County. 
7. Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed 
the construction of the Bridlewood Subdivision by their indecision 
with respect to the regional detention basin and their delay in 
other matters. This delay caused a potential flood hazard to 
exist in that Bridlewood remained only partially completed without 
curb and gutter, asphalt roads, catch basins, and a permanent 
storm detention facility for a much longer period of time than 
third-party plaintiffs originally planned or reasonably 
anticipated. 
8. Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed 
making a decision on the regional storm detention basin for 
several months. Thereafter, Bountiful City and Davis County 
negligently delayed working out any meaningful plan for the 
construction and implementation of the detention basin. These 
delays affected the ability of third-party plaintiffs to move 
ahead with the Bridlewood project. 
9. Third-party plaintiffs desired to develop Bridlewood 
in three phases and did not desire to cut a roadway into the 
subdivision from top to bottom, but rather planned to develop the 
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road in short phases or increments. 
10. Bountiful City and Davis County negligently and 
carelessly required third-party plaintiffs to cut one roadway in 
Brldlewood from top to bottom, and refused to allow the roadway to 
be developed in phases. 
11. Cutting the roadway from the top of the Brldlewood 
Subdivision to the bottom required much more excavation than 
third-party plaintiffs had planned and required more land to be 
devegetated than third-party plaintiffs initially planned. 
According to plaintiffs, these factors contributed to plaintiffs1 
damages. 
12. According to plaintiffs, the long roadway from the 
top of Brldlewood to the bottom acted as a funnel or channel for 
water, mud, and silt which the plaintiffs alleged flowed onto 
their property and caused them damage. 
13. Damages, if any, sustained by plaintiffs resulted 
from plaintiffs1 own negligent actions, acts of God, and the 
omissions and negligent actions of The Consortium, Davis County, 
and Bountiful City. 
14. In the event these defendants are found liable to 
plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then said 
liability would be passive, secondary and substitute in nature, 
whereas the liability of Bountiful City and Davis County would be 
primary and active in nature. Therefore, in such event, these 
defendants are entitled to be fully indemnified and recover 
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judgment over against Bountiful City and Davis County for the full 
amount of any judgment rendered against them in favor of 
plaintiffs, together with all costs and attorney's fees incurred 
by these defendants. 
15. In the alternative and in the event these defendants 
are found to be jointly liable with Bountiful City and Davis 
County for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs, and thus 
under the circumstances not entitled to complete indemnity, then 
these defendants are entitled to contribution from Bountiful City 
and Davis County in accordance with the Utah comparative 
negligence statutes in effect when plaintiffs first began to 
complain of damages. 
16. Pursuant to §78-27-37 et seq. [Utah Code Annotated 
(1986)], these defendants are entitled to have the fault of 
Bountiful City and Davis County determined on the special verdict 
submitted to the jury, and any fault found to rest with Bountiful 
City and Davis County should reduce the liability, if any, of 
these defendants to plaintiffs. 
COUNT II 
17. These defendants reallege and incorporate by 
reference herein paragraphs 1 through 16 of the Third-Party 
Complaint. 
18. On or about May 12, 1986, defendant Hale/Redd 
Investment Group signed a contract with Davis County, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
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19. Pursuant to the contract, Davis County was obligated 
to construct a regional detention storm basin for the protection 
of these defendants and third-party plaintiffs. The purpose of 
this basin was to control runoff, to prevent flooding, and 
protect these defendants from potential claims. 
20. The detention basin was not timely constructed. 
Plaintiffs claim to have sustained damages after the basin should 
have been constructed and operational. 
21. If the plaintiffs have sustained damages since the 
construction and operation of the regional detention basin, this 
damage resulted from the negligent design and operation of the 
basin. 
22. Damages sustained by plaintiffs, if any, were caused 
by Davis County's breach of its agreement to properly and timely 
construct the regional detention basin. 
23. Pursuant to contract, these defendants are entitled 
to be indemnified and held harmless from and against any and all 
claims asserted by plaintiffs against them. 
24. In the event it is determined that these defendants 
are not entitled to full and complete indemnity under the 
contract, these defendants are nevertheless entitled to an implied 
right of contribution pursuant to the contract. 
25. Pursuant to contract, these defendants are entitled 
to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by them 
in the defense of this action, 
WHEREFORE, in-the event these defendants should be found 
liable to plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then 
these defendants demand judgment against third-party defendants 
Bountiful City and Davis County as follows: 
(1) Full and complete indemnity. 
(2) Contribution. 
(3) Comparison of fault of all parties pursuant to 
current comparative fault statutes. 
(4) Costs of court and such other and further relief as 
to the court seems just and equitable. 
Dated this ^ day of /y^gLK\ 1987. 
Burton 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Landforms Construction Group, 
Landforms Development, Inc., 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Mark S. Sandberg, 
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, 
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a 
general partnership, a/k/a Redd 
Hale Investment Group, Hale/Redd 
Land Investment, a joint venture 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the^ 
foregoing was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this /A day 
f UJJ//J^L- * 1987, to the following: t L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Melvin C. Wilson 
Davis County Attorney 
Gerald E. Hess 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Davis County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Attorney at Law 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Layne B. Forbes 
Bountiful City Attorney 
P. 0. Box 331 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
George F. Fadel 
Attorney at Law 
170 West 500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
—
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22 
[Private property for public use,] 
Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-2 (Supp. 1988) 
Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for 
money or damages against a governmental entity 
or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's 
officers, employees, servants, trustees, 
commissioners, members of a governing body, 
members of a board, members of a commission, 
or members of an advisory body, student 
teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, 
students engaged in providing services to 
members of the public in the course of an 
approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training 
program, volunteers, and tutors, but does 
not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions 
identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or 
not the individual holding that position 
receives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its 
political subdivisions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity 
whether or not the act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as governmental, proprietary, 
a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a govern-
ment or governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or private 
persons. 
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(b) A "governmental function" may be performed 
by any department, agency, employee, agent, 
or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage 
to or loss of property, or any other injury that 
a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a pri-
vate person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind 
other than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, 
town, school, district, public transit district, 
redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental 
subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, 
any right, title, estate, or interest in real or 
personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, 
board, institution, hospital, college, university, 
or other instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-3 (1986) 
Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health 
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, 
or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 6 3-30-8 (1986) 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, 
or other structures• 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-9 (1986) 
Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement—Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or 
defective condition or any public building, structure, 
dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity 
is not waived for latent defective conditions. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10 (1986) 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act 
or omission of employee—Exceptions—Waiver for 
injury caused by violation of fourth amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discre-
tion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, 
infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or 
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(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal 
to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspec-
tion, or by reason of making an inadequate or negli-
gent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecu-
tion of any judicial or administrative proceeding, 
even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the 
employee whether or not it is negligent or inten-
tional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, 
unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob 
violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the 
collection of and assessment of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah 
National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county, or city jail 
or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state 
lands or the result of any activity authorized by 
the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing 
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, han-
dling hazardous materials, or emergency 
evacuations. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused or arising out 
of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as 
provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
If §78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts 
thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities 
shall remain immune from suit for violations of fourth 
amendment rights. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) 
Waiver of immunity for taking private property 
without compensation. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for the recovery of compensation from 
the governmental entity when the governmental 
entity has taken or damaged private property 
without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
according to the requirements of Chapter 34, 
Title 78. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-38 (1987) 
Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault 
exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to 
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess 
of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-40 (1987) 
Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault— 
No contribution. 
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for which 
a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is 
entitled to contribution from any other person. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-41 (1987) 
Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is 
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective propor-
tions of fault. 
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